Souleimanov, E., Ehrmann, M. and Aliyev, H. (2014) 
Introduction
Recently, a strategic partnership has been establishing itself between Israel, a Middle Eastern democracy in a tumultuous region, and Azerbaijan, a post-Soviet country on the shores of the Caspian Sea sandwiched between Russia and Iran. A close relationship between the Jewish state and the tiny oil-rich nation in the South Caucasus has attracted the attention of experts and policymakers in the region and beyond. The relationship, which features successful cooperation between a predominantly Muslim state and a Jewish state, has alarmed elites in Iran and elsewhere who fear an evolving tandem which, under certain circumstances, has the potential of shifting the balance of power in the region.
This article seeks to explore the multifaceted cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel that has turned into strategic cooperation over the recent years, singling out its various dimensions: international profiling, energy security, arms trade, agriculture, and last but not least, national security with an emphasis on Iran. More specifically, this study addresses following questions: what are the main characteristics of bilateral cooperation between Azerbaijan and Israel? Which incentives encouraged the establishment and proliferation of strategic partnership between these two countries? To answer these questions, this article argues that such geo-political and economic incentives as regional insecurity and threats, in conjunction with mutually beneficial cooperation in the energy sector, are the key factors which led towards the establishment of that unlikely partnership. Most importantly, this paper emphasizes that Azerbaijan's proximity to Iran and the continuous Azerbaijani-Iranian tensions play an important role in the establishment, development and strengthening of Azerbaijani-Israeli strategic partnership. However, this study argues that despite the centrality of the Iranian agenda in AzerbaijaniIsraeli partnership and the continuous expansion of mutually beneficial military cooperation, Baku would prefer avoiding direct confrontation with Iran and will continue keeping its relations with Israel 'under the surface.'
Although it appears that, often discrete and covert, the relations between Azerbaijan and Israel have been developing around the joint agenda of countering the Iranian influence and threat in the region, numerous economic, political and social factors have significantly contributed to the development of this relationship, as well. To address the above questions and arguments, this study borrows its insights from a wide range of literature, combining journalistic accounts with academic studies and analytical analyses.
Literature Review
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest, among both policy analysts and academics, in Azerbaijani-Israeli relations. A number of journalistic articles have been published on different aspects of Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel. For instance, Bourtman (2006) analyzes this relationship from a broader regional perspective with a particular focus on neighbouring Turkey and Russia. Ismalizade (2006) reported about the growing Israel's cooperation with Azerbaijan in energy sector. The BBC's Reynolds (2011) compares and contrasts the levels of Azerbaijan's proximity with Israel and Iran. Lim (2012) and Shaffer (2013) assessed the linkage of Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership to these countries' tensions with Iran. Iranian factor in IsraelAzerbaijani rapprochement has also been re-visited in a recent article by Geifman and Course (2013) .
However, in contrast to the growing volume of journalistic reports, the existing academic literature on Azerbaijan's strategic cooperation with the Jewish state is sparse: not a single book-length publication has been produced to date that can provide an in-depth analysis of the bilateral cooperation between the two countries.
Research on Azerbaijan's relations with Israel is far less widespread than studies analyzing Israel's foreign policy in the wider post-Soviet region (Cornell 1999) or Israel's relations with Central Asian and South Caucasian countries in general (Aras 1998; Bishku 2009) . A study by Aras (1998) Guzansky (2014) , which examines Israeli-Azerbaijani partnership from the perspective of broader Israeli policies in its periphery of current allies, including Greece, Cyprus and South Sudan. Noteworthy is that a similar thematic approach has been presented in an earlier article by Lindenstrauss and Guzansky (2012) , who offered an analysis of Israel's cooperation with its periphery -Greece, Cyprus and Azerbaijan -in the aftermath of its disagreements with Turkey.
A significant portion of research on Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel comes out of study on TurkishIsraeli relations. For instance, a comprehensive volume by Murinson (2009) in-depth explores the TurkishAzerbaijani-Israeli entente. A very similar analysis has been earlier provided by Veliev (2000) in his article on Israel-Turkey-Azerbaijan triangle. In a regional context, Azerbaijan's relations with Israel have been discussed in several other studies (Sobhani 1998; Calabrese 2007; Rhodes 2008) , which have researched Azerbaijan's relations with Israel through the prism of Israeli-Russian or Israeli-US-Iranian relations. In a broader international context, a range of studies has analyzed either Israel's policy towards Azerbaijan vis-à-vis Iran or Iranian policy with regards to Israel and/or Turkey and the United States with some reference to Azerbaijan (Parsi 2007; Roshandel 2011; Elik 2012; Lindenstrauss and Celniker 2012; Kemp and Gay 2013) . Far too little attention has been paid to research focusing exclusively on Israel's partnership with Azerbaijan. Two recent and very identical studies, which have a specific focus on Azerbaijani-Israeli relations, were produced by Ismayilov (2013) and Khalifa-zade (2013) ; both of these articles provide a detailed description of the strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel. However, these two articles have their research objectives limited to the descriptive coverage and are equally bereft of analytical insight.
In contrast to the previous research on Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel, this present study emphasizes the role of Iranian threats to both Azerbaijan's and Israel's security as a particularly strong determinant of booming partnership between these two countries. There has been little agreement in the literature (including both journalistic analyses and academic studies) to date on the relationship between the regional influence of Iran in the Middle East and the South Caucasus, and the strengthening of Azerbaijan's partnership with Israel. Perry (2012) , in his article in Foreign Policy Magazine, presented a comprehensive account, supported by recent evidence in favour of a linkage between Iranian nuclear program and Israel's increased interest towards Azerbaijan, in particular, and the South Caucasus region, in general. Similar arguments have been raised by Sultanova (2012) and Liphshiz (2013) . In contrast, Shaffer (2013) argues that the recent booming of Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership cannot only be associated with Azerbaijan's tensions with Iran. Instead, in Shaffer's argument, rapprochement with Israel is a part of Baku's strategy of countering broader regional tensions, including disagreements with Russia over the Caspian Sea region. On a similar note, Ismaylov (2013, 75) hypothesized that: "looking at the political cooperation between Baku and Jerusalem and their shared economic interests only in terms of common concern about Iran would be simplistic."
While this study accords with the opinion that the security concerns over Iran cannot serve as a sole explanation for advances in strategic partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel, the issue of Iranian influence in the Middle East and the South Caucasus region as a significant cause of both Azerbaijan's and Israel's concern and as a factor affecting their mutual relations deserves more attention. Therefore, unlike the existing research on Azerbaijani-Israeli relations and the role of Iran in cementing this partnership, apart from the emphasis on security concerns pertaining to Iran, this article also offers a detailed account of the two countries' relations beyond the issue of Iran, such as in energy sector, agricultural development and culture and society.
Country profiles
Although relatively discrete until now, relations between Azerbaijan and Israel date back to the early 1990s, when Azerbaijan sought military and economic aid following the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and Israel sought alliances among the newly formed post-Soviet states. An Israeli embassy was opened in Baku in 1993, but an Azerbaijani embassy has not yet been opened in Tel Aviv, predominantly due to fear over the discontent of Iran, an enemy of the State of Israel, and fear that such an act will lead Muslim-majority states in the UN to vote against Azerbaijan on the issue of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict (Shaffer 2013) . Nevertheless, relations between these two states have continued to develop strategically in many areas including culture, economics and, most significant recently, security.
Azerbaijan
The South Caucasus has widely been considered a strategic crossroads. Stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea, it links Europe with Asia on the west-east spindle and Russia with Turkey and Iran on the northsouth spindle. Importantly, the Caspian Sea harbours enormous deposits of oil and natural gas, of which Azerbaijan's proven reserves are estimated at seven billion barrels of crude oil (EIA 2013) and 2.55 trillion cubic meters of natural gas (Abbasov 2011) . Given that only a tiny share of Azerbaijan's national sector of the Caspian Sea has been explored, the nation's actual reserves of crude oil and natural gas might be even higher.
In its brief post-Soviet history, Azerbaijan suffered a humiliating defeat on the battlefield by Russia-backed Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, a conflict that devastated the country and turned hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis into refugees. Importantly, Azerbaijan lost around one fifth of its territory -seven provinces of Azerbaijan proper -in addition to the very territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. Since 1994, when a Moscow-brokered armistice was signed, no peace treaty has still been achieved. Thus, in official terms, Armenia and Azerbaijan are still in a state of war. Christian Armenians in the 1992-1994 war against Shiite Azerbaijanis, a move that was seen by Iranian elites to be largely pragmatic (Souleimanov 2011 ). Azerbaijan's relationship with Russia, another influential neighbour, has been much more balanced since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, even though problems occasionally surfaced between Baku and Moscow, as well. First, Russia is regarded in Azerbaijan as the main backer of Yerevan, whose pro-Armenian policies contributed to Azerbaijan's defeat in the Nagorno-Karabakh war.
Importantly, Russia's alliance with Armenia has since the 1990s prevented Baku from launching a renewed war on Armenia, an option that might otherwise have well proven feasible given Azerbaijan's impressive military budget (which is larger than the entire budget of Armenia) and the fact that Azerbaijan's population is triple that of Armenia. Moreover, as Baku has sought to reinforce Azerbaijani independence, Moscow has sought to regain a grip over the South Caucasus in general and Azerbaijan in particular, a factor leading to tension between the two states that is amplified by both countries' competition in the realm of energy exports.
Against this backdrop, Azerbaijan's relationship with Turkey has been marked by solidarity and economic cooperation, a fact that is enhanced by pro-Turkic sentiments in both countries, Ankara's interest in obtaining access to an energy-rich country, and the Azerbaijanis' desire to ensure that its oil and natural gas are being shipped from their land-locked country to world markets through Turkish territory. Even though Turkey and Azerbaijan lack a formal alliance, Ankara has profiled itself as Baku's key strategic partner on the international scene, a status that some Western nations, particularly the United States, have also sought in an effort to gain access to Azerbaijan's natural resources and to weaken Russia's position in this strategic area.
Israel
Established in 1948, Israel defines itself as Jewish and Democratic state; it is the only Jewish-majority state in the world. In its short history of statehood, Israel has faced seven wars, a series of armed conflicts, two intifadas, and countless other security issues. Turkey was the first Muslim-majority nation to recognize Israel, and refused to take sides in the conflict, due to the existence of extremists, including Al-Qaeda fighters, among the ranks of the anti-Assad opposition (Nuland 2012) . Importantly, the involvement of Iran in this conflict heightens the threat to Israel, especially in light of Iran's nuclear program. Israel has been an outspoken opponent of Iran's developing nuclear program, which Israel authorities believe may be used to create weapons of mass destruction that would be deployed against Israel or would end up in the hands of terrorists (Ehrmann, et al. 2013 ).
International profiling
Given Azerbaijan's uneasy geopolitical location and its troubled relations with some of its neighbours, a close relationship with Israel could be an enormous asset to Azerbaijan. The authorities of this South Caucasian republic have been eager to make use of this evolving relationship in a number of ways. First, a proper ideological basis has been mastered by Baku officials, who have frequently pointed to the fact that historically, Azerbaijan's Jewish community has experienced no anti-Semitic sentiment or, in the words of the country's chairman for religious organizations, that "Azerbaijan has a zero anti-Semitism rate" (Sokol 2013) . Indeed, home to around 17,000 people professing Judaism, both of Ashkenazi and Mizrahi origin, who are largely based in the country's capital city and some mountainous areas to the north, Azerbaijani lands have historically hosted a significant Jewish minority which still ranks among the biggest in the post-Soviet area and the Middle East.
Interestingly, Azerbaijani nationalism, with its heavily anti-clerical overtones, has never posited itself in opposition to the country's Jewish minority, a fact that is now being accentuated by Azerbaijani officials in order to gain the sympathies of Israel along with the influential Jewish lobby in the West, particularly in the United
States, which is seen as a potentially significant tool in impacting American policy toward Azerbaijan. 
Energy security
Still, the relations between the two countries are not confined to the realm of symbolic politics. To start with, a close relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan possesses a strong economic component. In fact, bilateral trade between Azerbaijan and Israel now totals some $4 billion annually, which ranks Azerbaijan as Israel's main trading partner in the Muslim world (Lim 2012) . As an essential producer of oil and natural gas, v Azerbaijan is interested in assuring prospective markets. In this context, Israel, burdened with latent conflict with some Arab oil-producing states, has for decades been put in a troubled position as it has sought to secure an unrushed inflow of strategically important resources, optimally from an inclined country that would not condition supplies based on political issues, nor would it use these supplies as a tool to exert pressure on the Jewish state. In this context, the present situation of Azerbaijani oil, constituting approximately 40% of Israel's consumption, seems to perfectly fit into both countries' agenda of energy security (Ghosh 2013) Turkey which would potentially have the capacity to carry 16 billion cubic meters of gas (Caspianoilgas 2013 ).
Furthermore, Israel has its own two major gas reserves, approximately 40 % of which it plans to export through such pipelines (Starr 2013 ).
Thus, energy security is a crucial component of economic relations between Israel and Azerbaijan.
Azerbaijan currently benefits from energy relations through heightened exportation of oil, while Israel currently enjoys increased importation of oil with a reliable partner. However, in the future, Israel may serve a larger role as exporter of energy through provision of gas from its natural reserves as well as through participation in a gas pipeline. In turn, SOCAR's plans for these pipelines suggest that Azerbaijan has an interest in importing energy resources as well. In other words, the current role of Azerbaijan as primary exporter and Israel as primary importer may become more even-handed, with both states having significant roles as exporters and importers. 
Focus on Iran
It soon turned out that the above purchases caused serious distress not only in Yerevan, a fact which would appear logical with regard to the unsettled conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh, but also in Tehran. Shortly after word spread of the deal, Azerbaijan's ambassador to Tehran was delivered a formal caution by Iranian authorities that its territory cannot be used for carrying out "terrorist attacks" against Iran -or on Iranian soil (Benari 2012) .
Moreover, according to the Iranian authorities, assassinations of nuclear physicists in Iran were coordinated by Israeli secret services from their safe havens in Azerbaijan. For instance, in early 2012, Iranian authorities identified on Azerbaijani territory one of the Mossad agents who, according to their claims, stood behind the earlier assassination on Iranian soil of Mostafa Ahmadi-Roshan, an Iranian nuclear physicist (Clayton 2012 ). In addition, Iranian officials have expressed concern over Baku's purchase of military high-tech which, according to some, could be used against "Iranian interests" in the region (Kucera 2013) . This assertion was readily refuted by
Azerbaijani officials who claimed that the newly acquired weapons and technologies were actually aimed at liberating Azerbaijan's Armenian-occupied occupied territories. ix However, this assertion has not seemed to totally calm Iranian fears. In the meanwhile, six Iranian agents who infiltrated the country to reveal the location of Israel-made drones were rounded up by Azerbaijani police (Wouk 2012 Azerbaijan (Lipshiz 2013) . Thus, the maintenance of a militarily strong Azerbaijan is important to Israel's security interest, particularly pertaining to Iran. Likewise, the fall of a secular Azerbaijan would be detrimental to Israel's security in this region and its efforts to counter Iran. As seen from this analysis, the highly covert and secretive partnership between Azerbaijan and Israel is heavily influenced by security concerns pertaining to Iran.
In spite of the significance of economic and cultural cooperation, that has been at the forefront of AzerbaijaniIsraeli relations, the mutual grievances over Iranian threats undoubtedly played a tremendous part in cementing the strategic relationship between the two countries.
Cooperation pertaining to Iran
Azerbaijan's active cooperation in military areas with Israel not only coincided with the increase of Iranian threat to Azerbaijan but is also entangled into broader international concerns over the Iranian nuclear program.
News of the purchases of Israeli military high-tech to Azerbaijan came at a time when international debates gained momentum. These debates were prompted by reports of the progress of Iran's nuclear programme, with Israel advocating for a pre-emptive strike on the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities and the United States, along with some key western nations, calling for the adoption of a restrained approach. 
